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ABOUT THIS EVENT 
Practitioners and scholars have long noted the tension between actors’ 
efforts to provide emergency healthcare relief during armed confl ict and 
their attempts to reconstruct sustainable public healthcare services in its 
aftermath. To explore the interdependent issues involved with confl ict, 
emergency relief, and healthcare system development, CSRS convened 
a workshop, Sustaining Healthcare in Post-Confl ict Environments, from 
July 13-16, 2008. Panelists and participants from non-governmental 
organizations, intergovernmental organizations, civilian governmental 
agencies, and the armed forces discussed the prospects and pitfalls they 
and local governments face in attempting to sustain healthcare systems 
and delivery in a rapidly changing, complex post-confl ict environment. 
This report represents the author’s interpretation of the workshop’s 
primary fi ndings. Participants did not formally endorse the fi ndings or 
recommendations identifi ed in this report.
International Medical Corps is a global humanitarian 
nonprofi t organization dedicated to saving lives and 
relieving suffering through medical relief and healthcare 
training programs. Helping people to help themselves 
is critical to returning devastated populations to self-reliance. For more 
information visit IMC’s website at www.imcworldwide.org.
The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies
(CSRS) is a teaching institute which develops and 
hosts educational programs for stabilization and 
reconstruction practitioners, including representatives 
from US and international non-governmental organizations, 
intergovernmental organizations, government civilian agencies, and the armed 
forces. Established by the Naval Postgraduate School in 2004 through the vision 
and congressional support of Representative Sam Farr (CA-17), CSRS creates 
a wide array of programs to foster dialogue among practitioners, as well as 
to help them develop new strategies and refi ne best practices to improve the 
effectiveness of their important global work. 
Located at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, CSRS also 
contributes to the university’s research and graduate degree programs. For 
more information about CSRS, its philosophy, and programs, please visit 
www.csrs-nps.org.
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in Post-Conﬂ ict 
Environments
July 13-16, 2008
During the emergency and 
stabilization phases of a confl ict 
(i.e., during and immediately 
after armed confl ict), responding 
organizations tend to focus on the 
immediate health needs of the local 
populace. When this phase ends 
and reconstruction begins, actors’ 
efforts shift to developing local 
resources and infrastructure that 
can be sustained without ongoing, 
direct foreign assistance. However, 
during these phases, responding 
organizations may inadvertently 
create an unsustainable “aid 
culture,” in which the local 
population comes to rely on foreign 
healthcare personnel, supplies, 
and technologies. In so doing, 
local capacity for healthcare 
may be supplanted and/or de-
legitimized. Such a culture impedes 
reconstruction of a local healthcare 
system if actors do not work with 
local organizations to develop 
skills, implement technologies, and 
shape expectations appropriately 
to enable the local population 
to take ownership of healthcare 
provision once reconstruction 
begins. As a consequence, actors 
and organizations have long debated 
how to balance and transition 
emergency healthcare relief 
— which is absolutely critical during 
Executive Summary
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As they transition between emergency 
relief and development, actors risk 
inadvertently creating an unsustainable 
‘aid culture’ and supplanting or 
de-legitimizing local healthcare systems. ”
“
The Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies hosts 
workshops on an array of cutting-edge 
topics, providing practitioners with an 
opportunity to deepen their cognitive 
learning, hone their skills, and broaden 
their professional networks. 
armed confl ict — with longer-term 
efforts to reconstruct sustainable 
public healthcare services once 
confl ict subsides. 
In response to this problem, 
the Center for Stabilization and 
Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) 
launched a research effort to 
examine these challenges amidst the 
complexities of diverse post-confl ict 
settings and healthcare systems. As 
part of this effort, CSRS organized 
a workshop, Sustaining Healthcare 
in Post-Confl ict Environments, held 
July 13-16, 2008, which focused 
on the development of sustainable 
healthcare systems in the aftermath 
of confl ict. The workshop centered 
on the different methods actors 
may use, both individually and 
collectively, to work toward a 
smooth transition from emergency 
healthcare relief to reconstruction 
of a sustainable public healthcare 
system. In addition, the workshop 
addressed cross-community efforts 
to leverage and rebuild local 
capacities for ownership of the 
healthcare system immediately 
after armed confl ict. Key themes 
for the workshop included local 
technical capacity, human resource 
development, and local ownership in 
healthcare systems.
CSRS events are designed to 
bring together both US and 
international members of the four 
primary communities involved in 
stabilization and reconstruction: non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), 
intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), government civilian agencies, 
and the armed forces. Sustaining 
Healthcare assembled more than 
two dozen expert participants from 
these communities. While some of 
the participants were healthcare 
specialists, the majority were 
stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) 
practitioners who work on fi nancing 
and implementing healthcare systems 
in confl ict and post-confl ict settings.
KEY FINDINGS
The participants emphasized 
the reality that post-confl ict 
environments are volatile in 
nature. As a consequence, no single 
template exists that can be used to 
reconstruct health systems. Many 
environments are not marked by a 
clear transition from war to peace, 
but instead experience both the 
presence and absence of violence. 
As a result, the overall context 
in which aid is distributed and 
used is often increasingly out-of-
sync with on-the-ground realities. 
Participants generally accepted the 
notion that successful operations in 
post-confl ict environments require 
signifi cant changes in the way 
donors, humanitarian agencies, the 
armed forces, and host governments 
plan and manage health system 
reconstruction programs. Despite 
this shared belief, the international 
aid community has been slow to 
change. Participants also affi rmed 
the need for additional information 
on interdependent relationships, 
ranging from broad linkages — such 
as the ties between state-building 
and peace — to more concrete 
issues — such as the timing and 
causes of transition funding 
gaps and the nature and extent 
of relationships between NGOs 
and Ministries of Health (MoHs). 
Actors need to understand such 
connections clearly in order to 
plan and implement healthcare 
reconstruction programs effectively.
Participants called for more research 
and data gathering on these issues, as 
well as a revision of donor defi nitions 
of relief and development aid that 
incorporate the changing realities of 
post-confl ict settings.••
Participants heard from an array of actors who have been involved in health system 
reconstruction initiatives around the globe. 
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The fi rst day of the workshop 
focused on an area of health 
system reconstruction that is 
often overlooked: the need for 
a healthcare workforce which is 
adequately trained and staffed to 
meet the challenges of a country 
recovering from confl ict. Participants 
heard presentations on post-confl ict 
environment healthcare efforts 
across the globe, ranging from 
Timor-Leste to Africa to Cambodia. 
Speakers included an array of 
experts, including Enrico Pavignani, 
consultant to the World Health 
Organization (WHO); Joyce Smith, 
author of the WHO Guide on Human 
Resource Development; and Prof. 
Anthony Zwi, School of Public Health 
and Community Medicine, University 
of New South Wales.
CONFLICT’S IMPACT 
ON HUMAN RESOURCES 
FOR HEALTH 
As Smith noted, most practitioners 
acknowledge that overall human 
resources are weakened by 
confl ict.1 She and Enrico Pavignani 
enumerated the consequences 
of confl ict for the healthcare 
workforce. During confl ict, the 
number of health sector workers 





Successful redevelopment of health services during post-
conﬂ ict reconstruction is dependent upon the availability 
of a balanced and competent workforce. This workforce 
is the most costly resource of any Ministry of Health, yet 
receives the least attention or funding. 
  — Joyce Smith, Author, World Health Organization 
Guide on Human Resource Development
”
“
Joyce Smith, an expert on human 
resource development in healthcare, 
provided participants with a primer 
on how confl ict negatively impacts 
healthcare workforces. 
deliberate targeting by warring 
parties, and outward migration. 
Within a confl ict-torn country, 
healthcare workers often migrate 
to secure areas away from the 
fi ghting, thus introducing vast 
disparities in the services and 
quality of providers available in 
different regions of the country. 
According to Smith, the impact 
of confl ict varies based on the 
individual circumstance of each 
country, from temporary loss and 
displacement of health workers, to 
mass migration, to a diminishment 
of the workforce. This loss of 
health workers can be as high as 
80 percent: In 1979 in Cambodia, 
for example, less than one percent 
of the pre-Khmer Rouge era 
medical workforce, 25 percent of 
the midwifery workforce, and 17 
percent of pharmacists remained.2 
Those highly qualifi ed health 
workers who strive to remain in 
their posts are frequently targeted 
by rebel forces, and they and 
their families face conditions that 
are extremely dangerous. As a 
consequence, many eventually leave 
the country. 
On the other hand, the remaining 
health workforce could expand as 
a result of foreign- or community-
sponsored training programs, 
producing an uneven mix of 
skills and experience. In general, 
medium- and long-term health 
concerns are often marginalized, 
as healthcare workers try to 
cope with the immediate impacts 
of confl ict on the population’s 
health. As a result, the average 
productivity of healthcare workers 
declines and their professional 
skills deteriorate. 
This degradation of the workforce 
has an extremely debilitating effect 
on the health system, attenuating 
service delivery and diminishing the 
capacity of training institutes. Such 
training centers are challenged to 
replace lost health professionals, 
while seeking to staunch the loss 
of their most qualifi ed teachers. 
These conditions often necessitate 
emergency stop-gap measures — such 
as withholding the diplomas of newly 
graduated doctors in Iraq3  — or more 
often, grossly increasing intakes 
for training despite the absence of 
suffi cient qualifi ed teachers, teaching 
equipment, or opportunities for 
clinical practice in a milieu where 
training institutions may be degraded 
or destroyed.
Enrico Pavignani highlighted some of the challenges post-confl ict nations face when 
seeking to rebuild their healthcare workforces. 
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RECONSTRUCTION CONTEXTS 
AND CHALLENGES
Smith detailed the importance of 
developing adequate human resources 
for health (HRH) in post-confl ict 
settings, as well as the critical 
challenges facing authorities as they 
attempt to rebuild the country’s 
healthcare systems. In the wake 
of confl ict, newly re-established 
health authorities are required to 
set up health services which are 
accessible to all citizens and which 
reduce morbidity and mortality. The 
reconstruction of health services in 
post-confl ict environments is entirely 
dependent upon the availability 
of competent, trained health 
professionals. Their availability is in 
turn contingent upon the extent to 
which the health workforce has been 
affected by the type and duration of 
the confl ict. In the rush to achieve 
these targets, health authorities 
seek to leverage all health workers 
who are available with little regard 
to their levels of knowledge and 
competence. In so doing, they ignore, 
as Smith noted, the fact that, “well-
trained, competent health workers 
deliver safe practice and save lives, 
but poorly trained, incompetent 
health workers, working beyond the 
scope of practice for which they have 
been trained, can kill.” 
Pavignani stated that the 
reconstruction of healthcare systems 
takes place within a broader context 
of a transition from war to peace. 
The transition process varies in 
form and content across time and 
countries, as well as within individual 
countries. He cautioned participants 
that transition and reconstruction 
processes are extraordinarily 
complex, with unclear beginnings 
and unpredictable outcomes, which 
usually make sense only in hindsight. 
Pavignani emphasized that political, 
economic, and military concerns 
always take precedence over social 
ones, including health. Furthermore, 
some of the distortions found in post-
confl ict healthcare systems may also 
pre-date the confl ict, although 
they may have been exacerbated 
by it. He stated, “The future 
health system will be shaped by 
the present (right or wrong) 
decisions on human resources.”
Smith also noted the political 
challenges posed by post-confl ict 
reconstruction. The redevelopment 
of health and related HRH systems 
occurs within the context of the 
overall restoration of government 
systems. The majority of people 
involved with cross-sectoral 
reconstruction efforts will assume 
roles and responsibilities for which 
they have never been trained nor 
gained the requisite experience 
to undertake. Equipping these 
individuals with the right skills 
requires a major investment in 
human capacity development. 
Moreover, embryonic governments 
are faced with highly political 
and diffi cult choices. They can 
either employ everyone, which will 
recreate large, over-staffed, and 
low-paid infrastructures, but which 
will contribute to political stability 
during a time when signifi cant 
numbers of refugees are returning 
Anne Clunan, the workshop facilitator, shares her perspectives on health system 
reconstruction with Stephen Commins of the International Medical Corps (IMC). The IMC 
served as a cosponsor of the workshop. 
The future health system will be shaped by 
the present (right or wrong) decisions on 
human resources.
                    –  Enrico Pavignani, independent consultant ”
“
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to an uncertain future; or they can 
seek to establish a leaner, more 
effi cient and better-paid civil 
service — the approach typically 
advocated by donors. 
In countries that experience 
prolonged periods of confl ict, 
health professionals and managers 
are isolated and do not have the 
opportunity to learn about state-of-
the-art development approaches to 
health service delivery and human 
resources development (HRD), said 
Smith. Thus, their memory of health 
systems is based on a pre-confl ict 
— and now outmoded — system. As 
the country emerges from confl ict 
and isolation, the health sector is 
confronted with a thorny problem: 
Large numbers of donors expect host 
government agencies to implement 
current development approaches 
with which its practitioners have no 
knowledge or experience, including 
decentralization and contracting of 
services. A country emerging from 
20 or more years of confl ict and 
isolation in the new millennium will 
fi nd that the approach to HRD has 
moved from a personnel and training 
approach to a comprehensive model 
encompassing human resource 
(HR) policy, planning, production, 
management (both personnel and 
performance), and fi nancing.
Smith enumerated the key tasks 
facing a transitional government 
seeking to reconstruct its health 
system’s human resources. It 
is especially critical that new 
authorities commence by identifying 
available health workers in the 
country and the potential stock of 
returning health workers. Yet, as 
Smith stressed, this is typically not 
the case. Instead, foreign donors 
and new transitional governments 
often begin their approach to post-
confl ict healthcare reconstruction 
by falsely assuming that a suffi cient 
supply of competent healthcare 
workers still exists within the host 
country. As it works to identify 
HRH, a transitional government 
must simultaneously develop an 
appropriate HR management system 
to commence dealing with the myriad 
HR issues existing in a post-confl ict 
setting. Governments must also 
identify the categories of health 
workers which will be offi cially 
recognized in a country, as well as 
their roles, responsibilities, and 
expected competencies. This will 
create a foundation for establishing 
health worker equivalencies for those 
trained though informal systems. The 
new authorities must also support 
broader civil service reconstruction, 
within which the health service 
How Evolving Human Resource Delivery 
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(Adapted from Egger 
and Adams 1999)4
Source: Joyce Smith, independent consultant, workshop presentation. Originally 
presented at a World Health Organization meeting in Geneva, Switzerland in 
September 2005.
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is placed, and must disseminate 
information widely about its HRH 
strategies, and how such strategies 
benefi t the local populace to create 
public support for the changes. 
In post-confl ict environments, 
determining health worker 
qualifi cations is a diffi cult and 
confused process, coinciding with 
the return of refugees desperate for 
employment. Most have been trained 
through ad hoc informal training 
systems and are not categorized 
at a fully registered health worker 
level, which requires three years of 
training. They also expect the leaders 
of their particular faction or tribe, 
who have become senior government 
offi cials, to give them preferential 
treatment for employment. 
Smith underscored the need to 
identify all possible sources of 
health workers when assessing the 
stock of HRH. The graphic above 
demonstrates some of the key 
sources that can be tapped when 
rebuilding the health workforce. 
Leveraging these resources enables 
actors and host government 
agencies to take a more systematic 
approach to locating workers. 
Different factions often will share 
information and records of their 
factional health workers and 
their training across government 
agencies willingly and frequently 
when their interests align.
Smith argued that most, if not 
all, health workers surviving a 
severe crisis will need intensive 
and sustained retraining and skill 
upgrading. As a consequence, 
host governments must be willing 
to address and ameliorate the 
impact of confl ict on the training 
and educational institutions within 
the country. Piecemeal training 
activities will have little positive 
impact if they are conducted in the 
absence of a comprehensive planning 
framework. As a consequence, 
actors should end ad hoc emergency 
training approaches and devote 
these resources to pursuing a more 
systemic approach. 
The amount of investment required 
for effective HR redevelopment and 
rebuilding of capacity in countries 
which have suffered prolonged 
confl ict is immense. Training capacity 
is likely to be in appalling condition 
and in need of massive investment 
to rebuild it to pre-confl ict levels. 
The management and regulation of 
human resources for health, as well 
as the incentives affecting behavior, 
need as much attention as training. 
While actors are often tempted to 
implement short-term solutions to 
alleviate health system ills, such 
“band-aid” approaches often have 
the propensity to evolve into long-
term problems. 
As the resources available for 
recovery will certainly fall short 
of existing needs, actors and host 
government agencies must make 
diffi cult decisions about where 
to allocate funds. These policy 
and planning discussions require 
credible resource forecasts and cost 
estimates; if such data is unavailable, 
these discussions will be devoid of 
content and decision-making will 
necessarily be ill-informed. 
Potential Stock of Health Workers
Former Civil Service
Diaspora
Cross-Border or Refugee 
Camp-Trained Health Workers
Rebel Group / Factional 
Health Workers






Source: Joyce Smith, workshop presentation. Originally presented in the Guide to Health 
Workforce Development in Post-confl ict Environments, released at a World Health 
Organization meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, in September 2005.
While actors are often tempted to 
implement short-term solutions to alleviate 
health system ills, such ‘band-aid’ 
approaches often have the propensity to 
evolve into long-term problems.                    ”
“
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HUMAN RESOURCES FOR 
HEALTH: CASE STUDIES
The wide variety of human resources 
for health conditions and outcomes 
that occur in post-confl ict settings 
were illuminated in the case studies 
provided by workshop panelists. 
Anthony Zwi presented the results of 
a study he led on the performance 
of the health sector of Timor-Leste 
during the violent confl ict that broke 
out from 2006-2007. An estimated 
150,000 people, around 15 percent 
of the country’s population, fl ed 
their homes because of civil confl ict 
and political violence in late April 
and May of 2006. More than 3,000 
homes were destroyed and dozens of 
lives lost. In the capital city of Dili, 
more than 64 camps for internally 
displaced people (IDPs) were 
established, and tens of thousands of 
people moved to peripheral districts. 
These individuals were typically 
housed by extended family. 
The peak period of violence in 
late April and May affected the 
Community Health Centers in Dili. 
Such violence, and the attendant 
service reductions, staff absences, 
and patient fears, led to declines in 
utilization by 50 percent or more in 
May and June. Health workers were 
themselves displaced, and many 
were anxious and fearful, in some 
cases failing to present to work 
for several months. The shortage 
of healthcare workers particularly 
affected vaccination programs. The 
TB Central Management Unit ceased 
to function effectively because 
most of its staff was absent from 
work for approximately two months. 
Even when staff and services were 
present, utilization levels were often 
low, refl ecting community concerns 
regarding security and safety. When 
worried about safety, people tended 
to access only those services brought 
to them via the 24-hour and mobile 
services developed in coordination 
with the Cuban Medical Brigade. 
As the MoH sought to respond 
to the crisis, it faced and met 
several challenges: maintaining 
services; reassuring the community; 
demonstrating effective governmental 
authority; motivating health workers 
to report for work; ensuring the 
neutrality of MoH and health workers 
during the confl ict; balancing 
emergency needs with ongoing 
programs and long-term development; 
and maximizing the value of available 
(and extra) resources.
According to Zwi, the MoH moved 
swiftly in late May 2006 — a period 
of acute violence — to demonstrate 
that the post-referendum scenario 
of 1999, which was characterized by 
the domination of the international 
community, would not be repeated. 
Stakeholders collaborated with the 
MoH in its efforts to coordinate 
with United Nations (UN) agencies 
and international NGOs. MoH 
Participants study case study materials to glean best practices they can use in 
future fi eld work. 
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personnel managed health services 
delivery and coordination. The 
Minister of Health identifi ed core 
services that were essential to 
continue uninterrupted and used 
the local television network, 
newspapers, and radio to inform the 
community about available services, 
reiterating that, “The Ministry is 
here and we are operational,” in 
the words of an local NGO worker. 
This communications strategy 
proved critical to maintaining local 
utilization of the healthcare system. 
Zwi emphasized the high degree 
of fl exibility and innovation that 
characterized the health sector 
response to the crisis. A senior 
member of the MoH team was 
provided with access to substantial 
funds and a mandate that these funds 
should be used, with discretion, to 
support essential service delivery 
activities. Dili National Hospital 
became a base for senior MoH 
personnel, with many relocating 
to the hospital, living in wards or 
tents. Senior Timorese managers 
met on a daily basis to review needs 
and develop strategies to address 
them. A number of international 
NGO leaders played an important 
role in motivating and supporting 
the MoH to coordinate the range of 
actors seeking to participate in the 
response. A few actors were also 
able to provide additional support 
to the Timorese health leadership. 
Development NGOs working in the 
health sector had built trust and 
rapport over years of negotiated 
partnerships with the MoH and were 
able to work actively together in 
the immediate period of crisis and 
violence. A Health Working Group was 
offi cially established on May 31, 2006, 
to coordinate those health services 
and activities beyond the normal 
functions of the MoH — especially for 
those related to the living conditions 
and additional health risks facing 
IDPs. Health services delivery was a 
particular focus, and coordination 
meetings offered an effective avenue 
to identify and respond to needs 
within both the community and 
internally displaced persons camps. 
Zwi noted that effective and 
engaged health workers are crucial 
to any health system. In times of 
crisis, health workers may withdraw 
from their professional activities 
and devote their time and energy 
to pressing family and community 
matters. Maintaining morale and 
motivating health workers is 
thus essential to the delivery of 
services. Failure to do so can lead 
to high levels of absenteeism, 
a decline in the quality of care 
provided, and leakage of staff out 
of the sector, with the risk of some 
never returning. In Timor-Leste, 
the challenge was to maintain a 
commitment to providing services to 
the community and to avoid being 
drawn into the confl ict in any way. 
Given that the health-related human 
resource base was extremely limited 
to start with, further disruption 
would pose signifi cant problems. Zwi 
said that another critical issue was 
maintaining support for healthcare 
workers’ security. During the crisis, 
many health workers were offered 
Prof. Anthony Zwi, School of Public Health and Community Medicine, University of New 
South Wales, analyzed actors’ efforts to rebuild the health system in Timor-Leste.
Maintaining healthcare worker morale is 
essential to preserving service delivery. 
                    –  Prof. Anthony Zwi, School of Public  
Health and Community Medicine, 
University of New South Wales
”“
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the chance to seek shelter and 
live on institutional premises. 
This strategy simultaneously 
demonstrated concern for health 
sector employees, while preserving 
their ability to continue working. 
Displaced health workers were 
told that they could work in 
other districts.
A critical factor in the success of 
the response was the joint emphasis 
from the MoH and senior staff on 
the neutrality and professionalism 
of health service workers. There 
was a serious risk early in the 
confl ict of polarization of staff on 
the basis of ethnic identity. Zwi 
quoted one senior health manager 
in Dili, who said that, “Everyone 
became an enemy for the other. 
Even some staff looked too confused 
about who they had to deal with 
fi rst. Some fi rst dealt with their 
family; there was almost a division 
between the staff. So we almost 
lost our professionalism as health 
professionals.” Staff members were 
disciplined by senior managers 
in response to reports that they 
were using ethnic preferencing 
to allocate provision of care. 
Managers were anxious to ensure 
that health professionals remained 
impartial and did not get drawn 
into the confl ict. Zwi found that 
the local populace viewed the 
health services as neutral, which 
was crucial to maintaining the 
commitment and morale of health 
workers and protecting the activities 
that were undertaken. The broader 
populace also supported the health 
workers, and health services were 
not targeted even when other 
government services and offi ces 
were. Zwi quoted a senior offi cial 
in the MoH who stated, “They 
never pointed their guns to the 
hospital, they never pointed guns 
to the pharmacy, and they never 
pointed guns to the ambulances. 
That’s why those services continued 
to function.”
Zwi stressed that the relationship 
between health service workers 
and the community they serve is 
critical to building and strengthening 
health services and human security. 
The trust that was displayed and 
reinforced during the 2006-2007 
crisis in Timor-Leste contributed to 
strengthening the health sector. No 
major disease outbreaks occurred 
as a result of the violence. The MoH 
was probably the best functioning 
sector during the crisis. It was able to 
meet the emergency demands arising 
from the violence as well as continue 
ongoing development activities, 
including planning and strategic 
development. The MoH successfully 
absorbed a high level of assistance 
and advice from international donors 
and organizations. 
Pictured: Homira Nassery, The World Bank and Peter Saleh, the Offi ce of the 
Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense.
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CASE STUDY: AFRICA
Enrico Pavignani compared health 
recovery processes in three African 
countries: Mozambique, Angola, 
and Sudan. 
Between 1990 and 1997, while 
the country was still in confl ict, 
Mozambique leaders formulated 
a  recovery strategy and budget, 
including a 10-year Health Manpower 
Development Plan. Toward the end 
of the war, Mozambique had a small 
and unbalanced workforce comprised 
of 16,000 health workers. Fifty 
percent of these health workers had 
no formal training and only three 
percent had university-level training. 
Primary healthcare-oriented workers 
were scarce. Half of the health 
workers were concentrated in urban 
areas. The north was grossly under-
served, and most of the training 
capacity was concentrated in the 
south. In 1991, the MoH formulated a 
coherent HRD plan for 1992-2002 to 
address existing distortions and foster 
post-confl ict recovery using a sector-
wide strategy. The planned workforce 
would develop according to the 
staffi ng needs of the recovering 
health sector, within explicit budget 
constraints. The fi nancing of training 
activities increased dramatically, 
thanks to generous donor support. 
Investment on the training network 
totaled USD $15 million. Annual 
recurrent expenditure for training 
exceeded USD $4 million. 
By 2003, the registered achievements 
in Mozambique surpassed the 
rosiest of expectations. The health 
workforce broadly corresponded to 
the targets set in 1991. Skilled staff 
grew by 45 percent. The proportion 
of the most skilled cadres expanded 
three-fold, whereas unskilled staff 
diminished by 22 percent. A total of 
2,000 ghost workers were removed 
from the payroll. Deployment 
patterns improved in aggregate 
terms, with the northern region 
gaining in capacity and reducing its 
gap with the south. Staffi ng patterns 
improved remarkably. Average 
workloads expanded by 29 percent. 
About 700 former rebel health 
workers, mostly without professional 
training, were trained and integrated 
in the formal health sector.
Pavignani identifi ed several 
shortcomings of the health sector 
reconstruction in Mozambique. 
The quality of training remained 
unsatisfactory, and primary 
healthcare-oriented cadres 
grew slower than planned. HRH 
management, regulation, and 
incentives were given inadequate 
attention, while archaic civil service 
provisions thwarted progress. The 
bias toward urban workers remained 
as strong as a decade before.
Pavignani said that, on balance, the 
Mozambique case strongly suggested 
that sustained collaboration between 
the MoH and donor agencies, sound 
technical work, and coherent 
implementation were key factors 
fueling the successful implementation 
of the plan. Some of the registered 
shortcomings were caused by forces 
outside the control of health actors.
Participants heard an array of case studies, ranging from Timor-Leste, to Cambodia, 
and Afghanistan, that demonstrated how various host governments have addressed the 
challenges of health system reconstruction. 
In Mozambique, the MoH formulated a 
coherent human resource development 
plan while the country was still in conﬂ ict 
to address distortions in the healthcare 
workforce and foster post-conﬂ ict recovery 
using a sector-wide strategy. 
                   ”
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In Angola, health recovery has 
proceeded piecemeal between 
1997-2005, fueled by oil revenues. 
In contrast to Mozambique, 
Angola’s MoH conceived and 
implemented an uncosted HRD 
plan. In Angola, Pavignani reported 
that the health workforce was 
comprised of 30,000 to 35,000 
staff in 1997, with only four 
percent trained at the university 
level. Half of the health workers 
were unskilled, while skilled 
workers were concentrated in the 
main cities. The productivity of 
health workers was low, while the 
healthcare they provided was poor. 
The MoH designed an uncosted 
HRH development plan, which 
included several key components: 
freezing the recruitment of 
support staff; strengthening 
higher training; expanding the 
ranks of under-represented 
categories, such as midwives; 
reducing the number and capacity 
of public training facilities; and 
strengthening in-service training 
capacity. Implementation met with 
several obstacles, including the 
forced absorption of former rebel 
health workers, decentralized 
recruitment, proliferation of 
private training outlets, limited 
clout and capacity of the MoH to 
enforce planned measures, and 
weak information systems.
By 2005, Pavignani noted that 
progress was registered on several 
fronts in Angola’s efforts to rebuild 
its health system. Legislation 
covering several HRD-related areas 
had been passed. The salary scale 
was restructured. Old categories and 
careers were converted into standard 
ones and absorbed into a new unifi ed 
system, while 3,800 ghost workers 
were removed from the payroll. 
A new health training system was 
designed and launched. In-service 
training and health management 
training programs were designed and 
introduced. Several training programs 
were reviewed, and some were 
formulated anew.
However, Pavignani identifi ed 
worrisome drawbacks that clouded 
the prospects for Angola’s health 
system reconstruction. The ranks of 
health workers expanded rapidly, 
surpassing 60,000 workers, of whom 
54 percent are currently skilled. 
As a result, the workforce remains 
oversized and under-skilled. Quality 
of training and care remain poor, 
and serious biases toward urban and 
hospital care persist. While Angola’s 
The workshop assembled actors with rich expertise and insights to share. 
12
HUMAN RESOURCES FOR HEALTH SYSTEM RECOVERY
plan was able to register progress 
on technical grounds, it lacked the 
support necessary to overcome 
politically induced distortions to 
healthcare reconstruction.
In South Sudan, the process of 
rebuilding created a foundation 
for an incipient health system 
that was shaky at best, noted 
Pavignani. Until 2005, healthcare 
in South Sudan was provided by 
two autonomous systems, split 
along the lines of control of 
belligerents. NGOs delivered basic 
health services across most of 
the countryside, formally under 
the watch of the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army/Movement (then 
a rebel movement). The Sudanese 
Federal Government was in 
charge of healthcare provision in 
garrison towns, where some large 
hospitals were located. The health 
authorities on each side chose 
to remain unaware of the health 
activities taking place beyond 
their reach. The two segregated 
systems differed on many counts, 
among them: working language, 
main providers, delivery model, 
and fi nancing. However, the two 
systems shared some common 
traits: poor quality of care, 
low effi ciency, heterogeneous 
standards, uneven coverage, and 
erratic operations.
After 2005, the signing of the peace 
agreement triggered a merging of 
the two disparate branches into 
a single health system, which is 
still underway despite enormous 
diffi culties. Suddenly, the new 
health authorities were forced 
to grapple with the politically 
charged reality that at 12,000 
individuals, the Southern Sudanese 
health workforce was much larger 
than previously thought and vastly 
surpassed staffi ng requirements. 
Moreover, it was composed of 
cadres of low competence (only 
three percent with university 
training), who had been trained by a 
multitude of training outlets in two 
different languages, according to 
different job descriptions, training 
programs, and traditions. Since 
2005, South Sudan has been trying 
to unify two mutually segregated 
health systems into a strengthened 
and autonomous one. A detailed 
human resource assessment was 
carried out in 2005. An HRH policy 
and a 10-year HRH strategic plan 
were formulated in 2007.
Pavignani condensed the fi ndings 
from the ambitious HR assessment 
of South Sudan carried out at 
the end of 2005. According 
to this assessment, “The HR 
administration is in chaos. Over 
thirty employers follow myriad 
procedures and policies to 
administer personnel without 
oversight in an un-coordinated 
fashion within an unplanned 
environment.” The assessment 
concluded that, “The stage is set 
for the arrival of an uncoordinated 
kaleidoscope of packages with 
multiple entrance criteria, 
objectives, and delivery strategies, 
all of questionable sustainability 
and appropriateness.” 
Pictured from left to right: Olga Bornemisza, London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine, shares perspectives with Stephen Commins.
After the signing of the peace agreement in 
2005, the Sudanese Federal Government 
was forced to integrate two disparate health 
systems, one of which had an oversized, 
poorly trained health workforce. 
             ”
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According to Pavignani, the South 
Sudan case study suggests that the 
effort to collect data and produce 
policy and strategic plans concerning 
HRH occurred too early in the 
transition, before decision-makers 
were ready to act, and when no 
institutional mechanisms were in 
place to implement decisions.
CASE STUDIES: CAMBODIA 
AND AFGHANISTAN 
Joyce Smith shared insights on the 
development of human resources 
for health in post-confl ict Cambodia 
and Afghanistan. In both cases, 
the identifi cation of available HRH 
and the effect of confl ict on the 
educational system and its production 
of health-related workers were 
signifi cant challenges. Smith noted 
that the ease of assessment of the 
available stock of HRH will vary with 
the post-confl ict context. 
In Cambodia, the dire lack of 
HRH led to emergency training in 
government facilities. Ad hoc, non-
standardized training by political 
factions and NGOs resulted in the 
creation of 59 different categories 
of health workers. This caused 
an overproduction of doctors and 
medical assistants to the detriment 
of other health professions. Similarly, 
in Afghanistan, ad hoc training by 
political factions and NGOs resulted 
in a lack of standardization of 
healthcare categories in refugee 
camps, across borders, and in 
the country. In this case, the ad 
hoc training process led to the 
overproduction of low-quality 
doctors, the underproduction of other 
professional capacity, and a severe 
shortage of female health workers.
Another key factor Smith highlighted 
was the competency testing 
and certifi cation of these health 
workers. In post-confl ict countries 
where governments share power, 
different factions may be willing 
to share information and records 
of their factional health workers 
and their training. This occurred in 
Cambodia; testing and certifi cation 
of competency there was done 
externally through the UN Border 
and Relief Organization, and the 
results were transferred to the 
United Nations High Commission 
for Refugees and WHO in Cambodia 
prior to the fi rst election. As 
a result, it was possible for a 
factional health worker to appeal 
Pictured from left to right: Ginny Nagy, Center for Disaster and Humanitarian 
Assistance Medicine, and Jeff Boss, Heart to Heart International.
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a politically motivated denial of 
recognition of qualifi cation and have 
his or her qualifi cations verifi ed 
by a UN agency. The ability to 
verify qualifi cations was crucial, 
as the lack of oversight in post-
confl ict environments often incents 
professional fraud, as would-
be healthcare workers create a 
proliferation of false certifi cates.
Smith contrasted the Cambodia 
case study with Afghanistan, where 
the UN and aid organizations had 
no coordinated process to establish 
health professional equivalencies 
when refugee health workers began 
returning to the country at the end of 
2001. Many NGOs and health agencies 
had no records of individuals they had 
trained. As a result, the Directorate 
of HRD of the Ministry of Public 
Health (MoPH) established a testing 
and certifi cation system in 2004 in a 
highly political environment. Joyce 
Smith participated personally in 
implementing this process. 
Afghanistan’s system tested a total 
of 2,349 health workers in nine 
different categories of nursing, 
midwifery, and allied health, all 
of whom had been trained outside 
government training systems. Only 
12 percent of those tested achieved 
“registered” level (three-year 
trained equivalent), 25 percent 
achieved “assistant” level, and 
the remainder were determined 
to require retraining. The HRD 
directorate also estimated that 
more than 50 percent of those 
individuals applying to take the 
examinations held false certifi cates. 
The results of the certifi cation 
process yielded valuable information 
about returning health worker skills. 
However, the large failure rates had 
major political implications for the 
MoPH, as offi cials sought to provide 
professional opportunities and 
support for workers who didn’t meet 
required standards. There was no 
budget for this extensive retraining, 
nor had donors made any provision 
for such an eventuality. 
Smith also focused on the effect 
of prolonged confl ict on countries’ 
educational systems and the 
ability of these war-torn countries 
to provide adequate and up-to-
date tertiary education for health 
workers. Confl ict — depending on 
its length and type — can engender 
a major gap between the actual 
knowledge of secondary school 
graduates and the knowledge 
necessary to enter tertiary medical 
education. Teachers who remain 
in countries undergoing confl ict 
have been isolated for prolonged 
periods, so they continue to teach 
outdated theory and sciences. 
Emergency approaches to teacher 
production usually result in new 
graduates being retained to teach, 
engendering a system where such 
novice teachers teach what they 
know, not what the market requires. 
The potential time investment 
required to catch up to regional 
levels can take up to 20 years, 
particularly in the medical fi eld. 
As an example, Smith cited the 
Cambodian genocide, which 
deliberately targeted the educated 
Pictured from left to right: Jeff Lewis, International Disaster Assistance and Relief 
Training, and Tom Stuebner, University of California at San Francisco. Jeff Lewis served 
as a co-facilitator of the workshop with Anne Clunan.
The ability to verify health worker 
qualiﬁ cations is crucial, as the lack of 
oversight in post-conﬂ ict environments often 
incents professional fraud.
                    ”
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classes across all sectors, eliminating 
almost an entire generation of role 
models and teachers. Following 
the defeat of the Khmer Rouge in 
1979, the government instituted 
emergency training, using the 
small number of surviving health 
professionals left in the country to 
train new health workers. Classes 
were large, with between 200 and 
300 students, with no books, teaching 
equipment, or opportunities to gain 
clinical experience. Top-scoring 
students were themselves retained 
as teachers, even though they lacked 
valuable clinical experience. This 
emergency approach continued 
without agency review of the 
numbers of trainees required or 
produced. As a result, doctors and 
assistants proliferated and other 
professions diminished. 
The impact of this emergency system 
was fi nally demonstrated when 
a diploma in health professional 
education course was implemented in 
1997. When the agency administered 
a basic mathematics test to a 
multidisciplinary group of 22 teachers 
from all health faculties, only two 
could calculate a ratio and only 
fi ve could calculate a crude death 
rate when given the formula. There 
was no difference in performance 
among the various professions. Smith 
stressed that the results were not 
related to the intelligence level of 
the individuals, but clearly refl ected 
the impact of more than 25 years of 
confl ict and targeted genocide on 
educational systems.
Smith stressed that failure to 
adequately assess the impact of 
confl ict on educational systems 
leads to false assumptions and a 
subsequent inappropriate use of 
funding for HRH. A careful assessment 
of the competency and stock of HRH 
available is required to produce 
appropriate HR policies and strategies 
to support redevelopment of post-
confl ict countries. ••
Long-Term Conﬂict’s Impacts on the 































Source: Joyce Smith, “Human Resources: An Essential Element for Health 
Recovery in Transition Settings. A Background Paper,” World Health Organization, 
Geneva, Switzerland, 2007. 
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The second day of the workshop was 
devoted to the issue of developing 
local technical capacity for health 
system recovery and reconstruction 
in the wake of confl ict. Participants 
heard presentations from Egbert 
Sondorp, Senior Lecturer, and Olga 
Bornemisza, Research Fellow, both 
of the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine; as well 
as Peter Saleh, Deputy Director 
for Global Health Security, Offi ce 
of the Secretary of Defense, 
US Department of Defense 
(DoD). Presenters addressed 
the policymaking and planning 
challenges faced in post-confl ict 
environments, the issue of funding 
in health system reconstruction, 
and the role of armed forces and 
donor governments in rebuilding the 
Afghan healthcare system.
PLANNING AND POLICYMAKING 
CHALLENGES 
Egbert Sondorp focused on the 
general question of what tasks 
and challenges were presented 
to planners and policymakers 
involved in post-confl ict health 
Rebuilding 
Technical Capacity 
in Post-Confl ict 
Healthcare Systems
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A panel of international experts 
presented best practices on developing 
local technical capacity for health 
system recovery and reconstruction in 
the wake of conﬂ ict. ”
“
Egbert Sondorp, London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine, addressed the 
policymaking and planning challenges of 
health system reconstruction. 
reconstruction. His research on these 
issues raised a more fundamental 
question facing policymakers and 
planners: What are the objectives 
in rebuilding a country’s healthcare 
system? Sondorp and his fellow 
health professionals advocate good 
health for health’s sake, but many 
actors also have broader goals, such 
as linking system improvements 
directly or indirectly to peace, 
governance, and state-building. 
Sondorp’s presentation exposed the 
different challenges these objectives 
raised, refi ning the relationship 
between health and state-building, 
and called for further research to 
demonstrate how health shapes 
peace building and state building.
Health system reconstruction 
objectives warrant different 
timeframes, noted Sondorp. In 
the case of “health for health,” 
actors and government agencies 
often focus on achieving quick wins 
and addressing urgent needs. For 
example, the anti-measles campaign 
in Afghanistan took place just 
after regime change removed the 
Taliban. The campaign managed to 
provide very good coverage against 
measles and claimed that it saved 
75,000 children’s lives. Such efforts 
and statistics often go unnoticed 
as they are not directly linked to 
peace development. In contrast, 
when actors use “health for peace” 
to “win hearts and minds” for the 
new government, they implement 
highly visible, rapid impact projects 
that improve public morale and win 
media coverage. The focus of these 
initiatives is on long-term political 
stabilization and legitimization of the 
new government.
Sondorp suggested that health 
for health’s sake was inadequate, 
as a stable healthcare system is 
impossible without good governance. 
Borrowing from Alan Whaites’ 2008 
research,5 Sondorp defi ned state-
building as the process to meet the 
requirements for a ‘resilient state.’ 
State resilience, in turn, is the ability 
of states to withstand and adapt 
to stress in ways that maintain a 
creative relationship between a state 
and society. State resilience requires 
organizational and institutional 
capacity to make and enforce 
policies; ensure the implementation 
of state-sponsored programs; and 
achieve other goals. These objectives 
include demonstrating legitimacy; 
implementing political processes to 
manage expectations, cementing 
the compact between state and 
its citizens; and improving access 
to resources. Responsive state-
building involves three necessary 
areas of progress, including political 
settlement, survival functions 
(security, revenue, law), and 
expected functions (infrastructure 
and social service provision). State-
Pictured: Michelle Lewis, International Disaster Assistance and Relief Training.
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building is the process of putting 
these building blocks in place.
Sondorp highlighted the need 
for empirical investigations of 
the interactions between health 
sector strengthening and state-
building. Sondorp offered as his 
core hypothesis the proposition that 
rebuilding health systems strengthens 
the social compact between state 
and society and contributes to state-
building. The delivery of effective 
health services signals the will and 
capacity of the state to act in a 
responsive and accountable manner 
on behalf of citizens, generating 
enhanced support for government 
in return. Some health system 
strengthening activities contribute 
to the wider goal of state-building 
by increasing the capacity of other 
institutions and sectors; by improving 
intergovernmental interactions at 
different levels of the state; and 
by promoting citizen involvement 
in public life. To explore this 
hypothesis, Sondorp accepted the 
WHO defi nition of a health system 
as consisting of six interdependent 
building blocks: service delivery; 
health workforce; information; 
commodities, such as medical 
products, vaccines, and technologies; 
fi nancing; and stewardship, which 
involves leadership and governance. 
(See graphic above.)
Sondorp stressed that health systems 
strengthening is essentially state-
building at the sectoral level, unlike 
health services improvement, 
which has different implications. 
This does not mean, however, that 
the state itself has to provide all 
of the services; rather, the state 
must simply ensure that healthcare 
services are delivered and are 
regulated to guarantee quality. In 
this view, ensuring improved health is 
only one important outcome of health 
system strengthening (HSS).
Sondorp argued that it is generally 
assumed that health produces wealth. 
As Sir Richard Feachem, a renowned 
international healthcare academic 
and former head of the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, 
and Malaria puts it, “Wealthier is 
healthier is wealthier.” The link to 
peace is explicit: A healthy population 
may reduce future confl icts, as 
healthy, wealthy people have more 
to lose from fi ghting. Most evidence 
suggests that both policymakers and 
practitioners feel strongly that the 
primary objective of health sector 
initiatives is to improve health 
outcomes. Sondorp affi rmed the 
widespread view that health sector 
strengthening can contribute to 
state-building in the health sector by 
developing legitimacy and capacity; 
as a consequence, HSS can put 
health on the state-building agenda. 
Most policymakers and practitioners 
recognize the state-building potential 
of some health interventions, though 
it is often achieved as an accidental 
by-product of other initiatives. Health 
interventions must be carefully 
designed if any state-building benefi ts 
are to be realized and maximized. 
For example, the principles of 
local ownership, partnership, and 
ensuring sustainability are frequently 
articulated, although not 
necessarily followed.
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Source: Egbert Sondorp, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, workshop 
presentation. Image derived from WHO Health System Strengthening Strategy 2007. 
Rebuilding health systems strengthens the 
social compact between state and society and 
contributes to state-building.
                    –  Egbert Sondorp, Senior Lecturer, London 
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Sondorp noted that the High 
Level Forum on Health Millennium 
Development Goals asserts that 
investment in health systems 
development in post-confl ict 
countries does contribute to 
consolidating the peace process 
and to state-building and advocates 
that health work should be planned 
in terms of what it can do to help 
underpin peace. Yet there is little 
evidence to support the Forum’s 
assertion. The research fi rm RAND 
conducted a review of health in seven 
post-confl ict countries and concluded 
from that research initiative that 
efforts to improve residents’ health 
can generate goodwill and that 
health can have signifi cant positive 
effects, including helping to win 
“hearts and minds.” 
Sondorp detailed several ways in 
which strengthening the health 
system can affect state-building. 
HSS should emphasize equally the 
dual imperatives of meeting short-
term health needs and building 
long-term capacity for sustainable 
service provision. Generally, work 
in fragile states often concentrates 
on facility-level service delivery 
or single-issue programs, with 
less emphasis on developing local 
institutional capacity in areas such 
as procurement, health information, 
and policy-making. Sondorp pointed 
to early evidence indicating that, at 
least in ‘chronically underperforming’ 
states, good progress can be made 
with HSS when health programs 
are designed with stewardship as a 
central objective; when government 
ownership is nurtured; and when 
there is suffi cient time for improved 
systems to evolve and undergo 
testing. If health services become 
more visible to the local population, 
the health sector will appear credible 
and legitimate in the eyes of the 
populace. However, visibility alone 
may not contribute to state-building, 
if, for example, visible services are 
provided by NGOs whose primary 
accountability is to donors, not 
the local authorities or the local 
population. Moreover, the quality of 
service provision appears to be as 
important for state credibility 
as visibility. 
However, Sondorp cautioned that 
actors do not fully understand the 
extent of state-building within the 
health sector: Evidence is generally 
anecdotal, inconclusive, and shaped 
by sectoral interests. Very few 
documented cases exist where the 
health sector is used explicitly for 
state-building; moreover, there is 
little evidence to suggest that this is 
an effective strategy. More research 
is essential, concluded Sondorp, as 
there is little if any clear evidence 
delineating the relationship between 
health strengthening, citizen and 
government expectations, and the 
social compact.
Participants discussed the dichotomy between “health for health” and “health for 
hearts and minds” initiatives.
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FUNDING GAPS: IS AID 
EFFECTIVE?
Efforts to strengthen systems 
in post-confl ict environments 
demonstrate a transition from 
meeting the health needs of a 
population suffering from the 
consequences of violent confl ict 
to rebuilding the country’s health 
system as violence concludes. 
During this transition, limited health 
services are typically provided by 
NGOs, and such services are often 
threatened with reductions. Olga 
Bornemisza explored the reasons 
for such a contraction of services, 
drawing on research she and her 
colleagues had done for the Health 
in Fragile States Network.6
The transition from confl ict to 
post-confl ict responses provides a 
structure for both donor and provider 
defi nitions of two discrete and linear 
sets of activities: humanitarian 
relief efforts on the one hand, 
followed by development projects 
on the other. The reduction in health 
service provision may be due to the 
fact that providers shift to a more 
sustainable, developmental approach 
from an emergency relief approach. 
However, Bornemisza stated that a 
more commonly articulated reason 
is the so-called “transitional funding 
gap,” in which a net reduction in 
monies available during transition for 
the health sector leads to reduced 
capacity to deliver health services. 
Bornemisza defi ned “transition” as 
occurring “when offi cial overseas 
development aid fl ows change 
from humanitarian to development 
funding lines.” This shift infl uences 
the aid funding modalities and 
the nature of services delivered. 
For example, project funding is 
available in crises; then this funding 
changes, and vertical programs 
begin to replace former programs. 
Bornemisza and her colleagues 
addressed three questions in their 
research: What were the fi nance 
gaps identifi ed by stakeholders? What 
aid instruments were deployed in 
the transition phase? And what were 
other perceived determinants of aid 
effectiveness in the country during 
the transition?
Bornemisza presented data on six 
countries’ funding fl ows to the 
health sector during the transition 
from relief to development that 
occurred over a period of 10 years. 
These metrics were established to 
determine if gaps in funding actually 
occur, or if they are usually averted, 
as well as to evaluate the effects of 
such funding gaps on health service 
delivery. A key problem in this 
research was the poor reliability of 
available data. The project relied 
on secondary data sources to map 
out transitional funding in six recent 
post-confl ict countries: Afghanistan, 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Sierra Leone, Southern Sudan, Timor-
Leste, and Liberia, with a case study 
developed on Liberia. Bornemisza 
noted the limitations of the available 
data: Discrepancies between pledges 
and actual disbursements are 
not discernible from the creditor 
reporting system, and annual lump 
Patterns of Aid to Fragile States in Crisis
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Source: Olga Bornemisza, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, workshop 
presentation. Adapted from World Bank materials.7 
Donor behavior is a major factor in funding 
gaps. Donor funding is stratiﬁ ed with funds 
going to speciﬁ c programs, often leaving 
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sum commitments reportage distorts 
actors’ ability to track aid by country 
and year. Poverty reduction strategies 
and other in-country data sources 
were useful for aggregate social 
services commitments, but were not 
disaggregated for health. Reliance 
on one set of data would suggest 
that global commitments peaked in 
2005, while another data set shows 
a steady increase. It is diffi cult to 
tell, using fi nancial data alone, 
whether transitional funding gaps 
were occurring in these countries. 
As a result, no group has been able 
to develop a clear picture of the 
overall situation. Interview data and 
documentary evidence have provided 
clarity in determining whether gaps 
occurred, or were perceived to 
have occurred, and the reasons for 
these gaps. To this end, 28 in-depth 
interviews were conducted with key 
informants from donors, the UN, 
international NGOs, the Red Cross, 
and independent experts.
In 2006, the Liberian Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare identifi ed a 
potential transitional funding gap as 
humanitarian donors were leaving the 
country. The Ministry provided a map 
of NGO-assisted clinics and projected 
closings of those clinics between 
2006 and 2008. (See graphic above.) 
If humanitarian funding attenuated, 
three-quarters of the NGO-assisted 
clinics were projected to close, 
resulting in a 77 percent decline in 
service provision. By December 2008, 
NGO-supported clinics, represented 
as green dots on the graphic, would 
turn red, indicating closure. 
By raising awareness and by 
lobbying successfully at a February, 
2007, Washington, DC, donor 
conference, Liberia managed to 
avert the funding gap. Donors 
agreed either to extend or increase 
humanitarian aid. Between 2007 and 
2008, development aid increased 
dramatically, while humanitarian 
assistance decreased slightly, 
suggesting that the relief approach 
was extended as a result of the 
delay in donors’ work to develop 
new development funding streams. 
Of the six countries analyzed, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, South 
Sudan, and Liberia had probable 
funding gaps. In Sierra Leone, 
analyses of possible funding gaps 
were inconclusive. There were no 
perceived funding gaps in Afghanistan 
and Timor-Leste.
Bornemisza then addressed the key 
determinants of the transitional 
funding gap. There are numerous 
reasons why the transition from 
humanitarian to offi cial development 
assistance differs, with some 
situations seeing a smooth transition, 
and others experiencing more 
unpredictable funding. However, 
the legitimacy and capacity of the 
recipient government, the manner in 
which NGOs negotiate the transition, 
and donor behavior and policy are 
the primary factors accounting 
for divergent outcomes. Donors 
are unlikely to fund governments 
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The Impact of Funding Gaps on the 
Liberian Health System in 2008
The increasing red 
dots indicate health 
facilities losing 
NGO support 
and which may 
have to close if 
additional resources 




Source. Olga Bornemisza, workshop presentation.  Adapted from Health in Fragile 
States Network materials.8
perceived to lack the legitimacy 
and the capacity to use the funds. 
The shift from humanitarian aid to 
development aid is often delayed 
by the absence of policy coherence 
and national recovery plans, weak 
leadership, and differing political 
agendas of donors and governments. 
NGOs are essential to helping 
facilitate the transition process, 
as they can mobilize resources 
to fi ll funding gaps. Their 
organizational fl exibility allows for 
rapid mobilization of temporary 
resources where anticipated gaps 
or project closure was imminent. 
Nevertheless, shortfalls and major 
delays in donor funding mean that 
NGOs have faced closure at both 
primary and secondary healthcare 
levels in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Southern Sudan. This 
resulted in large gaps in service 
delivery where the government did 
not have the resources for funding 
health facilities. NGOs often fail to 
coordinate their activities. Liberia 
was exceptional in this respect. 
NGOs, who can be substantial funders 
in their own right, may decide to exit 
a post-confl ict situation, leaving a 
gap in funding and services. 
Donor behavior is a major factor 
in funding gaps. Donor funding 
is stratifi ed, with funds going to 
specifi c programs, often leaving 
gaps. Donors do not coordinate and 
provide a harmonized approach to 
health system strengthening on a 
consistent basis. Moreover, aid fl ows 
are very unpredictable in transitional 
settings. Project management and 
disbursement delays, non-compliance 
with agreed conditionality, exchange 
rate fl uctuations, and political 
problems in recipient countries often 
contribute to short-term volatility 
of aid from one year to the next. 
Such unpredictability is thought to 
be caused by the length of the donor 
funding cycle and political dynamics.
According to Bornemisza, donor 
choice of aid mechanisms is another 
critical determinant of transition 
funding gaps. Donors sometimes 
choose instruments to avoid working 
with the host state and those 
that partner with it. (See graphic 
above.) The mix and sequencing 
of aid instruments can play a key 
role in ensuring the continuation 
of health service delivery and 
the facilitation of health systems 
building. Bornemisza quoted one 
donor as saying, “The funding gap 
is manufactured by the way that 
aid agencies are structured, with 
different rules and regulations and an 
array of units disbursing funds with 
limited coordination.”
When donors are more fl exible with 
their aid instruments, transitional 
funding appears to improve. For 
example, after lobbying, the 
European Commission’s Humanitarian 
Aid Offi ce (ECHO) extended its 
funding in Liberia when it realized 
that there would be a substantial 
gap if it left. This decision also 
allowed funds to be used for more 
developmental approaches of 
capacity building rather than merely 
relief-oriented service delivery. 
Aid Mechanisms in Transition












Source: Olga Bornemisza, workshop presentation. 
The funding gap is manufactured by the way 
that aid agencies are structured, with different 
rules and regulations and an array of units 
disbursing funds with limited coordination.
                    –  Olga Bornemisza, Research Fellow, London 
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However, the extension of 
humanitarian funding was generally 
found to lead to a continuation 
of the humanitarian approach to 
health service delivery, marked by 
state avoidance rather than a more 
developmental state partnership 
approach. Donors have also created 
new funding mechanisms, such as 
the United Kingdom’s Department 
for International Development’s 
Basic Services Fund, which was 
developed to bridge the gap 
between humanitarian and offi cial 
development assistance funding lines 
in South Sudan. 
Overall, the study found that it is 
not the choice of an aid mechanism 
used in the transition from relief 
to development, but rather the 
fl exibility to adapt the aid mechanism, 
or the mix and sequencing of 
aid mechanisms, that infl uences 
transitional funding fl ows. Donors who 
have to deal with the internal transfer 
of programs (such as the Offi ce of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance to other 
offi ces within USAID and ECHO to 
European Development Funding) face 
particular challenges.
Additionally, the signifi cant lack of 
knowledge about actual and future 
funding trends presents major 
challenges for health planners and 
nascent governments faced with the 
task of reconstructing a fragmented 
or non-existent health system. It is 
diffi cult to know whether transitional 
gaps exist or to predict if and when 
they will occur. As a result, health 
service providers such as NGOs 
face signifi cant obstacles when 
attempting to take coordinated 
action and lobby for more funding. 
Lacking this knowledge, donors fi nd 
it diffi cult to harmonize their aid to 
ensure that major gaps in service 
delivery do not occur.
CASE STUDY: ACTORS’ ROLES 
IN  RECONSTRUCTING HEALTH 
SECURITY IN AFGHANISTAN
Peter Saleh served as the senior 
US health attaché in Afghanistan 
and described his experiences with 
the military, donors, and health 
security actors in reconstructing the 
healthcare system in Afghanistan. 
He stressed the need for the United 
States to incorporate health into its 
understanding of national security 
and into its strategies for achieving 
national security objectives in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In describing 
lessons learned, Saleh highlighted 
the need for more funding, 
cooperation, stability, and security. 
He detailed the advantages and 
drawbacks of his organization’s 
implementation plan in Afghanistan 
— as well as public perception — and 
concluded with action items for the 
diverse group of actors involved in 
post-confl ict environments. 
Saleh highlighted the key role health 
system reconstruction can play in 
gaining popular support for the local 
government and the United States. 
Pictured: Jeff Lewis and Peggy Meites, US Agency for International Development.
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However, he criticized the US military 
for being slow to recognize this fact. 
Global security, according to Saleh, 
will be achieved only by building 
stable and strong societies, of which 
health is a critical, but undervalued 
part. He cited a US Government 
report that stated that global 
perceptions of the United States will 
be increasingly critical in determining 
its government’s effectiveness 
around the world. As a result, Saleh 
argued that the United States will 
increasingly need substantive, 
strategic public diplomacy assets with 
which it can effectively engage the 
world. The United States’ strength 
in public health should be used to 
engage the world in a highly positive 
and concrete fashion. 
Saleh stated that the US Government 
is in competition with terrorist 
organizations that use health 
and humanitarian assistance as 
an ideological weapon to gather 
support from vulnerable populations. 
Terrorists exploit economic, 
social, and political vulnerabilities 
throughout the Muslim world. They 
exploit socioeconomic vulnerabilities 
of governments they oppose through 
violence, political subversion, 
and humanitarian assistance. 
Malnutrition, poor sanitation, 
and lack of access to healthcare 
are primary causes of unrest and 
confl ict, increasing a country’s risk 
for terrorist exploitation. Isolated 
and underserved groups are not only 
vulnerable to disease, but also to 
extremist infl uence. 
Saleh argued that the US military 
needs to understand that providing 
healthcare to a nation is part of its 
campaign to win hearts and minds, a 
fact that terrorist groups understand 
well. As Saleh put it, “This is one 
way to use the word ‘weapon.’” 
Insurgents, terrorists, and opponents 
of legitimate government rule such 
as Hamas and Hezbollah have active 
humanitarian and social services 
arms. After the 2006 Lebanon war, 
Hezbollah gave cash to families 
whose houses had been destroyed, 
and provided healthcare services that 
the Government of Lebanon could 
not. In addition, the organization 
provided free medical care for life 
to the families of soldiers killed 
in action. Extremist groups have 
few bureaucratic obstacles, know 
the local culture better, and have 
extensive local connections. To 
defeat extremists, Saleh stressed, 
the United States must make capacity 
building the centerpiece of its 
efforts by improving interagency 
coordination, strengthening 
monitoring and evaluation, and 
striving for transparency in its 
activities. Therefore, in post-confl ict 
societies, Saleh said, “We must ask 
ourselves, how quickly can 
we get involved?” 
Post-confl ict and fragile states put 
global peace, stability, and public 
health at disproportionate risk. In 
many instances, providing services 
directly undermines the ability of 
legitimate governments to build 
capacity by demonstrating their 
inability to meet the basic needs 
of their population. After the 
Capt Robert Firman, US Air Force, discusses  the role of the armed forces in health 
system reconstruction. 
Terrorist groups who use healthcare services 
to win the hearts and minds of a nation 
understand that, “this is one way to use the 
word ‘weapon.’”
                  –  Peter Saleh, Deputy Director, Global Health 
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immediate confl ict and during the 
reconstruction phase, the United 
States must boost the capacity of 
government agencies in vulnerable 
areas so that the local population 
perceives the government as the 
primary provider of essential 
services. A whole-of-government 
approach, according to Saleh, 
increases the chances of success 
of health diplomacy, rather than 
separate programs run by 
various agencies. 
According to Saleh, international 
investment in public health could be 
the most valuable counterterrorist 
measure yet to be deployed. 
However, Saleh noted that the US 
Government has not effectively 
implemented essential interagency 
coordination and planning in health 
in post-confl ict states to date. 
Efforts have been characterized by 
a lack of coordination between and 
among the approaches, policies, 
and systems of aid agencies, donor 
governments, and the national 
government. To complicate matters, 
the lack of collaboration and pooling 
of resources by US agencies has 
resulted in competing projects and 
confl icting advice from different 
parties and stakeholders in the 
healthcare sector. These opposing 
efforts have further undermined the 
ability of the responsible ministries 
to meet their objectives. 
Saleh then recounted the efforts 
the US Government took to rebuild 
Afghanistan’s health system. Such 
efforts only became a priority in 
2003, after US attention shifted 
from capturing Osama bin Laden and 
toppling the Taliban to implementing 
S&R programs. The military 
emphasis has been on grassroots 
relief and reconstruction. Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), the 
Commander’s Emergency Response 
Program (CERP), and Overseas 
Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic 
Aid programs have all played a 
signifi cant role in the Afghanistan 
healthcare reconstruction process. To 
help resolve security problems, PRTs 
were formed. These civil-military 
partnership teams coordinate and 
fund small infrastructure projects, 
provide limited local security, and 
help extend the programs of the 
central government throughout 
Afghanistan. In addition to American 
teams, other North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization countries are fi elding 
their own teams in various regions. 
According to Saleh, their success has 
varied widely depending on where 
they are based. Teams deployed in 
the Pashtun area have had little time 
for reconstruction activities; however, 
all of the teams have been successful 
in their efforts to build ties with the 
local communities and assist NGOs in 
accomplishing their missions. 
Saleh said that the primary PRT 
mission has been to provide a 
stabilizing presence outside of 
Kabul on behalf of the national 
government and the US Government 
by befriending local villagers and 
helping them with local rural 
development assistance (RDA). 
PRTs’ grassroots work has delivered 
visible benefi ts to the population; in 
addition, the teams have provided 
local security for the community 
and the workers that provide the 
assistance. Saleh said this concept 
is working well in Afghanistan. The 
PRT program has expanded rapidly 
in Afghanistan and now represents a 
major tool for the delivery of RDA. 
There are two signifi cant reasons 
for the successes of the PRTs. First, 
PRTs provide a security umbrella for 
military RDA activities that are not 
available to civilian programs, even 
in the immediate vicinity. Second, 
they have a powerful program 
under CERP to quickly undertake 
community RDA projects without 
lengthy delays for project approval 
and funding availability. 
In Afghanistan, Saleh noted, DoD 
provides healthcare services to 
Pictured: Peggy Meites and Homira Nassery.
26
REBUILDING TECHNICAL CAPACITY IN POST-CONFLICT HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS
civilian populations directly. These 
direct service activities help 
create goodwill but also increase 
governmental and community 
dependence on US assistance, while 
decreasing the capacity of the MoPH. 
This inadvertently creates a parallel 
healthcare system that leaves the 
host government worse off when 
the US military departs and service 
provision ends, creating a vacuum. 
In situations where direct service 
provision is appropriate, actors must 
anticipate and plan for a transition 
to sustainable activities. Actors can 
help legitimate governments build 
their capacity to provide essential 
services. To ensure that health 
activities are effective contributors 
to  reconstruction, US Government 
agencies with a stake in the health 
sector must plan these activities 
together. Despite their disagreements 
on budgets and priorities, health 
professionals must work together to 
coordinate, cooperate, and integrate 
these programs. 
Saleh noted that the US Department 
of State (DoS) was the lead US 
agency coordinating reconstruction 
efforts in Afghanistan. Although 
DoS and DoD have taken steps to 
improve coordination of stabilization 
and reconstruction activities, 
Saleh noted that problems still 
plague their ability to integrate 
planning for potential operations 
and strengthen military and civilian 
capabilities to conduct them. One of 
the key challenges is the differences 
in agency planning capacities and 
procedures. In an attempt to share 
experiences and coordinate efforts, 
the US Government Group for 
Health was formed in early 2004. It 
was composed of the Department 
of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), DoD, DoS, USAID, and the 
US Department of Veterans Affairs. 
According to Saleh, the group agreed 
that the lack of adequate healthcare 
management capability in existing 
facilities was a major impediment to 
sustainable healthcare improvement 
and capacity building. Simply 
investing in the health sector would 
not produce the desired results 
unless programs were adequately 
managed. The group agreed to 
consider options for improving 
health management in Kabul by 
leveraging available resources 
and working with Afghan partners 
to create a common solution. As 
part of this effort, HHS agreed to 
support the costs of a healthcare 
management group that would 
bring together the diverse array 
of stakeholders, including Afghan 
Government offi cials, major donors, 
NGOs, and other international 
organizations, currently working 
in Afghanistan to discuss several 
models for improving healthcare 
management in Kabul and determine 
which one had suffi cient political 
and fi nancial backing to carry out 
what was necessary. 
Saleh also argued that DoD needed 
to learn to engage with NGOs, to 
increase information exchange 
through conferences, meetings, 
and carefully designed exercises. 
Familiarity is key, noted Saleh: The 
more interaction DoD and NGOs have 
Participants discussed host governments’ involvement in health system reconstruction, 
including how to promote local ownership and ensure sustainability. 
Actors who provide health services directly 
create a parallel healthcare system that 
leaves the host government worse off when 
partners leave and service provision ends.
          ”
“
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with one another during non-crisis 
events, the greater the likelihood 
they will understand each other in 
the fi eld. In addition, building these 
relationships will also help DoD and 
NGOs craft ways of working together 
that maintain independence, so that 
it is not compromised in the eyes of 
civilian populations.
Saleh concluded that while military 
healthcare activities may be short 
in duration, they have long-lasting 
negative and positive effects. He 
therefore believes that it is desirable 
that DoD health activities build 
towards long-term development goals 
of the post-confl ict country, as well 
as the work of civilian agencies that 
support those goals. DoD personnel 
involved in the planning, execution, 
and oversight of activities intended 
to benefi t the civilian population 
must be familiar with the guiding 
principles of civilian development 
agencies. Saleh noted that DoD 
activities in civilian sectors such as 
health, education, and governance 
are understandably controversial. 
However, he stressed that where 
needs arise and where civilian 
agencies lack access, either because 
of inadequate security or capacity, 
these tasks will fall to the military 
by default. As an example, Saleh 
offered the case of the Iraqi health 
sector, where USAID — ostensibly 
the lead US Government agency 
for supporting Iraqi health sector 
reconstruction — had no major 
health activities in the country. NGO 
activity was limited, for the most 
part, to heroic efforts by a handful of 
international and local organizations. 
Civilian reconstruction projects 
and military operations have been 
strategically linked in Afghanistan 
to a greater degree than in many 
previous environments. Saleh gave 
the example of USAID reconstruction 
experts and DoS colleagues sharing 
housing and assessment duties with 
Coalition military forces in the 
form of civil-military PRTs. In other 
cases, military personnel provide 
air and ground security to major 
reconstruction projects, like the 
Kabul-Kandahar-Heart highway, or 
even initiate smaller reconstruction 
projects themselves. ••
Peter Saleh shared a defense perspective on health system reconstruction imperatives. 
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On the third day of the workshop, 
participants focused on the issue 
of “local ownership” of healthcare 
systems — how to increase the local 
population’s level of participation, 
trust, and contributions to the health 
system — and what expectations 
NGOs, external donors, and aid 
agencies should have regarding 
local ownership. Richard Brennan, 
Health Director, International Rescue 
Committee and Linda Doull, Director 
of Health and Policy, MERLIN gave 
presentations on the challenges NGOs 
face in promoting local ownership 
given their organizational constraints.
REBUILDING INFRASTRUCTURE
Richard Brennan focused on the 
defi nition of “local ownership” 
and the role of NGOs in developing 
it in light of their organizational 
programs and constraints, noting 
that there is no commonly 
agreed upon defi nition of what 
“local ownership” constitutes 
in post-confl ict reconstruction 
of healthcare systems. Who 
Local Participation 
and Ownership 
of Post-Confl ict 
Healthcare Systems
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There is no commonly agreed-upon 
deﬁ nition of what ‘local ownership’ 
constitutes in post-conﬂ ict reconstruction 
of healthcare systems. Who owns these 
systems — and to what extent?”
“
Participants network at the workshop’s 
opening reception. 
owns these systems — and to 
what extent? Some practitioners 
refer to the “sustainability” 
of national healthcare systems 
when discussing local ownership, 
implying that local communities 
and national governments must be 
able to sustain the health system 
fi nancially, which, in Brennan’s 
view, is almost impossible. 
Despite its advantages, Brennan 
stressed that local ownership of 
health systems is not an end in itself, 
but only a means of promoting high 
quality, equitable, and sustainable 
health services. In theory, local 
ownership suggests that the local 
partner has full responsibility for 
program design and management 
and implementation, that the 
implementing agencies belong to 
the recipient country, and that there 
is transparency and accountability 
among all stakeholders. Achieving 
local ownership, he emphasized, 
should be avoided as a concrete 
program objective. In many cases the 
rapid pursuit of local ownership can 
undermine health goals or prove to 
be unrealistic. Brennan argued that, 
“Full and literal ownership by local 
actors is unrealistic in the medium-
term,” as most post-confl ict health 
systems will continue to heavily rely 
on external aid for funding, technical 
assistance, and policy guidance for 
many years. Local ownership can 
only be phased in over years through 
processes that apply the “principles 
of participation, partnership, and 
capacity building.” 
Local ownership should not serve as 
the holy grail for exit strategies in 
post-confl ict countries; rather, noted 
Brennan, the real benchmark defi ning 
when to exit — for his and many 
other NGOs — is the end of funding. 
Many agencies do not have a clean 
exit strategy. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
Brennan suggested that actors have 
not yet seen a clear exit strategy, as 
there are needs wherever one looks.
Given these realities, argued 
Brennan, aid agencies ought 
to incorporate a vision of local 
ownership into their planning and 
programming. Such an approach, 
in Brennan’s view, has multiple 
advantages: Health programs and 
interventions are more relevant 
and responsive to local needs, 
sustainability is promoted, NGO 
paternalism is limited, and the 
government’s responsibility for 
health is maintained. Moreover, it 
is critical to maintain a vision of 
local ownership to ensure that aid 
Richard Brennan, IRC, served as a workshop presenter. 
30
LOCAL PARTICIPATION AND OWNERSHIP OF POST-HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS
agencies treat local peoples with 
respect and dignity, as capable 
individuals rather than helpless 
victims. Preserving an ideal of local 
ownership limits the dependency of 
the local population and the external 
creation of an aid culture. The 
principle of local ownership promotes 
principles of cost-effectiveness and 
effi ciency and ultimately allows 
external aid organizations to exit 
the host country. The pursuit of 
local ownership is desirable in 
order to make health services more 
responsive, relevant, and effi cient; 
however, there are many practical 
challenges to attaining it. 
While the International Rescue 
Committee’s (IRC) decision on 
when to leave a country is driven 
by the availability of funding, the 
organization still incorporates local 
ownership into its overall approach 
to the country. The IRC’s approach 
is based on a program framework, 
noted Brennan. Health programming 
is the largest section, but the IRC 
works in education, sanitation, and 
other fi elds, working to create long-
lasting solutions. However, the fi rst 
priority is saving lives and meeting 
basic needs. The IRC also works to 
strengthen institutions and promote 
social foundations, as well as to 
facilitate community-wide cohesion. 
Most signifi cantly, the underlying 
principles of the program can 
contribute to the concept of 
local ownership, specifi cally 
participation, capacity building, 
and partnership. Partnerships take 
the form of a specifi c project run 
in alliance with a local organization 
with a common mission. Other 
important principles that facilitate 
local ownership are the protection 
and promotion of individual rights. 
In the IRC’s conception, the 
participation ladder begins with 
ownership, and runs down several 
rungs of participation levels, 
including interactive, functional, 
consultation, information transfer, 
and passive. (See graphic above.) 
Ownership means the local partner 
has the full ability to design, manage, 
and implement the program. Child 
mortality rates provide one example. 
Countries undergoing or recently 
exiting confl ict have the highest 
rates of child mortality: This is true 
in Sierra Leone, Angola, Afghanistan, 
Liberia, and Somalia. These countries 
also have huge resource gaps in 
providing for health expenditures. 
The worst hit are Congo and 
Burundi: In 2002, these countries’ 
macroeconomic health spending 
was $84 per capita, with actual 
costs reaching much higher levels. 
Rwanda provides another example. 
Although 15 years have passed since 
Rwanda’s genocide, 44 percent of 
Rwanda’s healthcare funding still 
comes from foreign donors, if all 
health expenditures from external 
resources are considered. Brennan 
noted that Rwanda has a long way to 
go to achieve sustainability in health 
systems provision.
Case studies of the Sudan and Sierra 
Leone, stated Brennan, provide 
lessons for promoting local ownership 
of health services at the community 
and district levels and illustrate the 
The Health System Reconstruction 
Participation Ladder
O w n e r s h i p
P a s s i v e
I n f o r m a t i o n  T r a n s f e r
C o n s u l t a t i o n
F u n c t i o n a l
I n t e r a c t i v e
Source: Richard Brennan, IRC, workshop presentation. 
Building local ownership into a healthcare 
programming model promotes principles 
of cost-effectiveness and efﬁ ciency 
and ultimately allows external aid 
organizations to exit the host country.
              ”
“
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practical challenges in achieving such 
ownership. On the community and 
district levels, ownership is a balance 
between service delivery and health 
systems strengthening. The process 
involves setting objectives, choosing 
people, building skills, and managing 
workforces and systems effectively. 
As an example of the diffi culties 
in setting up local healthcare 
services, Brennan cited his work in 
Ganyiel in South Sudan. In 2005, 
infant monthly mortality rate in 
this region was 5.1 deaths per 1,000 
children under the age of fi ve. In 
these training programs, community 
health workers were trained in 
local villages, requiring participants 
to have a sixth-grade education 
and to speak and write in English. 
Participants were trained for nine 
months to build health units which 
would serve as the primary source of 
service provision. Among those 108 
individuals identifi ed as potential 
trainees, only four could read and 
write. Political tensions can often 
compound the diffi culties in providing 
health care, if local leaders appoint 
unqualifi ed workers to join the ranks 
of healthcare providers. 
In Sudan, a community-based 
treatment project achieved an 80 
percent reduction in under-age 
mortality because of a strong sense 
of community empowerment and 
engagement. Intense community 
participation in the project, 
including selection of community 
drug distributors, ensured that the 
program that was developed was 
highly supported and respected. 
Aid agencies worked with local 
providers to create effective systems 
of supervision, drug management, 
and data management that were 
complemented by community 
support. Brennan stressed that the 
way in which NGOs approach local 
communities and give input into 
the design of programs and the 
selection of managers and community 
distributors is critical to healthcare 
programs’ success.
Even though the NGO provides 
funding and direction for the 
project, the community serves 
District Level: Lessons Learned
Providers Authorities•
Providers Politicians
Understanding power structures and relationships:
Central plans and policies not effective at local 




Source: Richard Brennan, workshop presentation. 
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as manager. Such management 
responsibility generates a great 
sense of pride and ownership 
in the program. For example, 
in the Kenema District in Sierra 
Leone, infant mortality rates 
were quite high, reaching 2,000 
for every 100,000 women. While 
the IRC began an emergency 
obstetric care project in 2005, 
the centrally planned project met 
with resistance from the district 
authorities. Collaboration with IRC’s 
district health team was initially 
very diffi cult and unsuccessful. A 
prolonged consultative process with 
the district team and authorities 
enabled the IRC to gain a better 
understanding of local power 
structures and relationships. Finally, 
after introducing patient, collegial 
engagement, and performance-
based management processes, 
the program was able to phase in 
services over time, noted Brennan. 
The program was ultimately a 
success: The case fatality rate for 
obstetric complications declined 
from about 10 percent to two 
percent, and the number of facility-
based births has signifi cantly 
increased as a result. 
THE ROLE OF NGOS 
Linda Doull spoke about the role of 
humanitarian NGOs in rebuilding 
healthcare systems in the wake 
of confl ict. While the ultimate 
responsibility for the performance 
of a country’s healthcare system 
lies with its government, state and 
non-state actors play an important 
role in helping them build capacity 
and capability. These actors include 
national governments such as 
the MoH, the UN system, NGOs 
(international or national), faith-
based organizations, wider civil 
society, donors and Global Health 
Partnerships, the private sector, and 
the military (e.g., PRTs). 
The role of NGOs in health service 
delivery and wider health system 
recovery, according to Doull, has 
not yet reached its ascendancy. 
However, she cautioned, the term 
NGO should be used very loosely, as 
it often incorporates civil society. 
NGOs can be quite diverse in terms 
of mission, organizational culture, 
and behavior. In countries such as 
Liberia and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, national and international 
NGOs continue to play a substantial 
role in health system support by 
contributing to service delivery, 
institutional capacity building, 
and supporting the policy process. 
However, the manner in which NGOs 
engage in health system recovery 
deserves further study, including 
their willingness to adapt to changing 
circumstances (which many involve 
leaving the country), and to develop 
effective, empowering partnerships 
with the MOH. This adaptation to the 
continually evolving circumstances 
inherent in post-confl ict contexts is 
critical at a time when the demand 
for health services is increasing, 
expectations of the population are 
high, and MoH capacity is challenged. 
Doull quoted an African Ministry of 
Health and Social Welfare (MoHSW) 
offi cial to emphasize her point: 
“NGOs need to adapt to evolving 
Linda Doull offered a primer on NGOs’ role in rebuilding healthcare systems in post-
confl ict environments. 
NGOs need to adapt to evolving 
circumstances and respect the path of the 
Ministry of Health and Social Welfare.
                    –  African Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare ofﬁ cial, as quoted by 
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circumstances and to respect the 
path of the MoHSW.”
Doull stated that her organization, 
MERLIN, focuses on two key 
principles: providing medical 
relief and lasting healthcare; and 
supporting the existing health system 
rather than creating a new one. 
Achieving the latter objective, noted 
Doull, requires a strategic partnership 
with the MoH, particularly in 
MERLIN’s key program areas of 
reproductive and child health, major 
disease burdens, and upholding the 
right-to-health through a targeted 
health system strategy. Doull stated 
that NGOs must assess whether their 
efforts to resurrect health services in 
post-confl ict situations are effective. 
While there is scant documented 
evidence of specifi c NGO-MoH 
partnerships, there is a great deal 
of conceptual information about 
principles for such partnerships. 
To rectify this situation, MERLIN 
conducted partnership reviews of 
MoHs in 17 countries as well as four 
in-depth case studies in Liberia, 
Sudan, Ethiopia, and occupied 
Palestinian territories in 2007-
2008. This review demonstrated a 
consistent pattern of service delivery 
and system support. However, the 
review also revealed limited NGO 
involvement in higher-level system 
strengthening activities, such as 
policy development (on human 
resources and health fi nancing, for 
example), and in advocacy regarding 
stewardship, governance, and 
accountability of health services. 
Overall, the review found that there 
is little documented evidence of best 
practices in relationships between 
NGOs and MoHs.
The questions raised by this 
study, Doull emphasized, have 
implications for health sector 
recovery: Are decision makers 
proactively seeking and using such 
lessons? Should NGOs shift their 
sphere of engagement to address 
these limitations? What are the 
consequences for a potentially 
greater role of NGOs in the state-
building process? Doull stated 
that the biggest challenge facing 
NGOs is: “How do we provide 
basic health services that address 
immediate needs, but also how 
do we ensure that we are meeting 
larger-scale and long-term needs 
that are integrated into national 
health strategy?”
NGOs should ensure that they do not 
actively work against the latter goal 
Pictured from left to right: HMCS David Tellez, US Navy; Egbert Sondorp; and 
Miriam Abdelkerim, International Organization for Migration.
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by creating health service delivery 
systems that parallel offi cial ones; 
implementing a hybrid service 
delivery system that involves the 
state and NGOs; and employing a 
hybrid system that involves the NGO 
and other civil society organizations. 
In some countries, the NGO role in 
health sector recovery is enormous. 
In Liberia, for example, NGOs support 
75 percent of health facilities. 
However, not all NGOs promote local 
ownership of healthcare systems or 
strive to build effective partnerships 
with Ministries of Health. In these 
cases, NGOs may follow MoH 
protocols, such as using essential 
drug lists; providing program support 
for service delivery; and contributing 
to capacity strengthening when 
NGOs train staff and offer them 
incentive payments. However, 
ownership of these programs often 
remains within the NGO. Some 
NGOs, on the other hand, attempt 
to build MoH capacity and promote 
local ownership by progressively 
handing over responsibility to the 
MoH for activities and supporting its 
development of new systems. This 
was MERLIN’s approach in Liberia 
with respect to contributing to its 
national health information system 
and implementing its management 
of county health teams according to 
a national Basic Package of Health 
Services framework.
Several factors limit the partnerships 
between NGOs and MoHs, noted 
Doull. These include NGOs’ mandates 
and working models, issues of 
transparency and trust, states’ 
perceptions of NGOs, current system 
capacity, and the nature of funding 
environments (in particular, the 
timeframe in which different types 
of activities are supported). She 
suggested that one of the biggest 
obstacles may be of the NGO 
mandate of neutrality. Transparency 
and trust is a two-way street: Local 
communities may not necessarily be 
transparent, and NGOs may arrive 
with pre-conceived perceptions. This 
can disappear when NGOs engage 
effectively with local communities. 
However, some problems may arise 
with funding gaps, as in the case of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
In this region, even though the 
government was willing to partner 
with NGOs, the MoH was not. The 
release of funding was convoluted 
and tied to detailed exit strategies for 
each proposal, making implementation 
and long-term planning and capacity 
building extremely diffi cult. As a 
consequence, there is a clear need 
to change the funding environment 
to create funding partnerships and 
streamlined handover procedures. 
She cautioned that exit strategies 
should not be tied to donors’ desire to 
transition from providing relief monies 
to supplying development funds.
Doull noted that the relationship 
between national and international 
NGOs can also be essential as 
health reconstruction shifts from 
emergency relief to development 
and building local ownership in 
health systems. Many of these 
relationships are contentious and 
ineffective. Acrimonious, ineffective 
relationships can lead to the failure 
Scale of Nongovernmental Organization 
Involvement
Liberia: 75% of the health facilities 
are still supported by NGOs
– 300 out of 389 functional facilities
– MERLIN supporting service delivery 
    in half of the country
•
•
Collective budgets of health sector 









Source: Linda Doull, MERLIN, workshop presentation. 
Several factors limit the partnership between 
NGOs and MoHs, including NGO mandates 
and working models, transparency and 
trust issues, current system capacity, and 
funding environments.
                    –  Linda Doull, Health Director, MERLIN”
“
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of local NGOs. In Afghanistan, MERLIN 
partnered with Care of Afghanistan, 
which created a strong alliance that 
enabled the merging of operating 
staff, creation of harmonized 
policies, and submission of joint 
proposals to the MoH. This made 
it possible for MERLIN to be more 
effective, as it was no longer seen as 
an external entity. 
According to Doull, NGOs and donors 
do not engage in vital refl ection 
about the higher level and broader 
goals of institutional capacity and 
policy development. As the graphic 
on page 35 demonstrates, MERLIN’s 
review found a mixed record of 
NGO involvement on this score. 
NGOs too often follow the patterns 
of money that donors distribute 
for relief and development. Doull 
challenged the NGO community 
to examine its programming and 
efforts in post-confl ict countries 
critically and to recognize the need 
to shift from service delivery to 
working with the state on longer-
term goals of institution and policy 
building. She also challenged donors 
to reconsider how they fund health 
system recovery, to bridge the gap 
between humanitarian relief and 
development funding streams. 
Doull welcomed the beginning of 
such changes in the form of pooled 
funds and multi-donor trust funds. 
Since health sector actors’ needs 
often change during transitional 
periods, these funds’ fl exibility and 
responsiveness should be improved 
to support the strengthening of long-
term health systems. ••
 
Participants used workshop breaks to build new relationships with other S&R actors.
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No single template can be applied 
to the reconstruction of health 
systems, given their diverse nature. 
Instead of a clear transition from 
war to peace, many environments 
experience situations that are 
marked by both the presence and 
absence of violence. As a result, 
the overall context in which aid is 
distributed and used is increasingly 
out-of-sync with on-the-ground 
realities. Participants generally 
accepted that this reality requires 
signifi cant changes in the way 
donors, humanitarian agencies, 
the armed forces, and recipient 
governments plan and manage 
health system reconstruction. 
However, the international aid 
community has been slow to 
change. Participants also discussed 
the need for critical information 
on broad linkages, such as those 
between state-building and peace 
to more concrete issues, such as 
the timing and causes of transition 
funding gaps, and the nature and 
Conclusion
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Aid organizations need to change their 
funding models to reﬂ ect the volatile nature 
of post-conﬂ ict environments.”
“
Nick Tomb, CSRS Program Coordinator, 
helps Olga Bornemisza prepare for a 
workshop session. 
extent of relationships between 
NGOs and MoHs. 
While some participants made strong 
cases for the link between health, 
state-building, and peace, arguing, 
as Peter Saleh put it, “Health is 
an undervalued measure of global 
security,” others suggested that it 
is diffi cult to know if health system 
reconstruction contributes to building 
strong states and stable societies. 
As Egbert Sondorp stressed, there 
is very little evidence regarding 
the contribution of health to state-
building, and what evidence exists 
is mixed. There is widespread 
disagreement on whether health 
should be used as an entry point for 
state-building, or if the focus should 
be on health for health’s sake. It is 
also unclear whether strengthening 
the technical capacity of the health 
sector can spill over into other public 
sectors. In many countries, the 
MoH is often a low-status entity — 
weak politically, institutionally, and 
fi nancially, with insuffi cient authority 
for wider state-building. As a result, 
the current US emphasis on health 
as part of a broader state-building 
strategy may not be well-founded. 
In addition to the lack of 
knowledge on the relationship 
between health and state-
building, not enough is known 
about the transition in funding 
from relief aid to development 
assistance to prevent potentially 
severe gaps in aid for health 
system strengthening. Data-
collection instruments, donor 
funding, and local political 
dynamics make it diffi cult 
for donors, NGOs, and host 
governments to identify when a 
transition funding gap will arise. 
Very little is known about the 
impacts of volatile funding and 
funding gaps on health services 
and health outcomes after 
confl ict. Clearly, more tracking 
and utilization of data on relief 
and development fi nances is 
needed, so that assistance can 
be planned, harmonized, and 
rendered predictable. 
Participants emphasized that actors 
in health system strengthening 
should monitor their efforts against 
achieving the broader aim of 
Pictured: LTC Lisa Forsyth, US Army. 
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post-confl ict reconstruction. This 
is especially true in the case of 
developing human resources. Actors 
involved in HRH initiatives must 
include government bodies, aid 
agencies, professional associations, 
health workers, and users of health 
services. An HRH development 
strategy should align with the 
political, economic, administrative, 
and social changes (including 
the peace process) underway in 
the country. Restructuring the 
workforce involves implementing 
controversial measures, and must 
be undertaken within the broader 
process of reforming the civil 
service and rebuilding educational 
systems, all of which need 
adequate political support. 
Participants stressed that a 
balanced health workforce includes 
medical, nursing and midwifery, and 
allied health workers. Post-confl ict 
reconstruction tends to focus on 
specifi c categories to the exclusion 
of other professions, perpetuating 
imbalance. In the long-term, 
sector-wide and balanced strategies 
to health recovery are more 
benefi cial than single-measure or 
sub-sectoral approaches. 
Participants also recommended 
that donors revise aid mechanisms, 
improving their fl exibility and 
creating economic bridges between 
humanitarian and development 
assistance. Donors should assess 
the mix and sequencing of aid 
mechanisms so that their efforts 
complement others’ instruments 
and mitigate the potential of 
funding delays and/or gaps. 
Donors should also improve their 
coordination to identify which 
groups can provide necessary 
services, such as technical 
assistance, in critical timeframes.
Participants challenged the 
assumption that sustainability of 
health systems was synonymous 
with complete ownership and 
fi nancing of the health system by 
local authorities and the population. 
Instead, they suggested that the role 
of the international community was 
to facilitate local ownership through 
community buy-in and participation, 
while committing to providing 
external technical assistance and 
funding for the long-term. Local 
ownership involves understanding the 
realities of local power structures and 
providers; programs must be locally 
endorsed by offi cials if they are to 
succeed. Successful projects require 
patience, collegial engagement, 
technical and professional credibility, 
and time to take root. 
Moreover, effective health system 
strengthening requires changes in 
the ways in which health sector 
actors engage with one another 
and the ways in which they are 
funded. NGOs working on healthcare 
systems should cooperate with those 
groups spearheading state-building 
initiatives, particularly in the areas 
of building institutional capacity 
and developing health policy. MoHs 
must accept and make use of NGO 
capacity in these areas. Donors 
must alter the ways in which they 
Matthew Vaccaro provided an overview of CSRS’s mission, programmatic focus, and 
upcoming workshops. 
Workshop participants recommended that 
donors revise aid mechanisms, improving 
their ﬂ exibility and creating economic 
bridges between humanitarian and 
development assistance.




defi ne and allocate aid for relief and 
for development to keep systems 
functioning effectively during this 
critical transitional period.
Participants discussed the need 
for local knowledge, context-
specifi c approaches, and long-term 
funding for human resources for 
health development. Variance in 
the length and intensity of confl ict 
will have important impacts on 
the available human resources 
and on the capacity for rebuilding 
and retraining a competent health 
workforce, as the case studies make 
clear. The rehabilitation of human 
resources should commence as soon 
as possible, in wartime if possible, 
while addressing local needs and 
cultural nuances. 
A key theme that emerged from the 
workshop was the changing nature of 
both the post-confl ict environment 
and the requirements of aid. 
However, participants stressed that 
this recognition was not widespread, 
and that there the international aid 
community was myopic in this regard. 
Too much international assistance 
in health system reconstruction 
continues to be driven by funding 
cycles and donor priorities. The 
majority of NGOs followed the 
parameters laid out by donors, rather 
than pushing for recognition of the 
changing conditions on the ground. 
The participants called on donors to 
rethink the distinction between relief 
and development and restructure 
their health system reconstruction 
funding streams accordingly. ••
CSRS workshops provide a deep look at an array of S&R topics, including health 
and humanitarian issues, institution building and security sector reform, S&R skills 
and tools, economic recovery, and maritime and naval affairs. 
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